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HAZLETT ET AL.
REGULATORY FOCUS AND FORECASTING PREFERENCES
hOpING fOr ThE bEST Or  
prEparING fOr ThE wOrST?  
rEGulaTOry fOCuS aNd prEfErENCES fOr 
OpTIMISM aNd pESSIMISM IN prEdICTING  
pErSONal OuTCOMES
Abigail hazlett and Daniel C. Molden
Northwestern University
Aaron M. Sackett
University of St. Thomas
People are rarely completely accurate in forecasting their own futures. in-
stead, past research has demonstrated tendencies for both optimistic and 
pessimistic bias in thinking about one’s own outcomes. Furthermore, both 
biases are thought to be potentially functional. Recently, an “intuitive func-
tionalist” account of forecasting biases has been proposed (Sackett & Ar-
mor, 2010; see also Armor, Massey, & Sackett, 2008), which posits that 
individuals flexibly shift between optimistic or pessimistic outlooks based 
on the perceived value of each outlook. The present research examines 
people’s chronic motivational orientations as one factor that influences 
perceptions of the functional value of optimistic or pessimistic outlooks. 
Across three studies, we demonstrate that those primarily concerned with 
growth and advancement (i.e., promotion) prefer optimistic forecasts and 
perform better when adopting an optimistic outlook, whereas those primar-
ily concerned with safety and security (i.e., prevention) prefer pessimistic 
forecasts and perform better when adopting a pessimistic outlook.
Understanding how people anticipate the consequences of their behaviors is of 
great importance for understanding what behaviors they choose. Individuals who 
make different predictions concerning the actions they take are also likely to make 
different decisions about which goals to pursue, what strategies to use in working 
toward these goals, and whether to persist in the face of obstacles.
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When predicting their own future, people may err in the direction of optimism 
(“I’ll shed these extra pounds quickly”) or they may err in the direction of pes-
simism (“I’m never going to lose these last 5 pounds”). Previous literature has 
focused primarily on determining which of these errors is most common (e.g., 
Scheier & Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980) or most beneficial 
(e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Scheier & Carver, 1993; Tay-
lor & Armor, 1996). The present research, however, builds on more recent efforts 
to determine when individuals might desire to be optimistic or pessimistic (Armor, 
Massey, & Sackett, 2008; Sackett & Armor, 2010) to investigate whether people’s 
basic motivational concerns influence why individuals gravitate toward one out-
look or the other. Specifically, the present research proposes that one function of an 
optimistic outlook is to support a motivational orientation toward advancement 
(i.e., promotion) and that this outlook is therefore preferred by promotion-focused 
individuals, whereas one function of a pessimistic outlook is to support a motiva-
tional orientation toward security (i.e., prevention) and that this outlook is therefore 
preferred by prevention-focused individuals.
ThE prEvalENCE aNd CONSEquENCES Of  
OpTIMISTIC aNd pESSIMISTIC bIaSES
Optimism about future outcomes is one of several well-established self-serving 
biases (see Taylor & Brown, 1988), at least among people with Western European 
cultural backgrounds (see Heine & Lehman, 1995; cf. Rose, Endo, Windschitl, & 
Suls, 2008). Weinstein (1980) found that participants in his studies were optimis-
tic about their chances of achieving positive outcomes (e.g., landing a good job) 
and avoiding negative outcomes (e.g., getting divorced) across a wide variety of 
important life domains including work, relationships, and health (see also Dun-
ning & Story, 1991). Moreover, some researchers have proposed that, in addition 
to being prevalent, these types of optimistic biases are functional and adaptive be-
cause they sustain coping and well-being in times of stress (Taylor & Armor, 1996; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Indeed, Scheier and Carver (1993) have even argued that 
optimism has not only psychological but also physical benefits, and have shown 
that dispositional optimists had better health outcomes in the days and months 
following open heart surgery than did pessimists (Scheier et al., 1989). Although 
others have argued that optimism can also have drawbacks for mental and physi-
cal health (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005), the pre-
vailing view seems to be that optimism often serves a positive, functional purpose 
for well-being (see Taylor & Armor, 1996). 
Complementing these studies on optimism, additional research has demonstrat-
ed the functionality of pessimism as well; Norem and Cantor (1986) have observed 
that although optimism may be a common bias, (a) many individuals are dispo-
sitionally pessimistic, and (b) these individuals may use pessimism as a buffer 
against potentially debilitating performance anxiety. In studies supporting these 
observations, not only were a distinct group of defensive pessimists identified, but, 
for these individuals, taking a pessimistic viewpoint was found to improve their 
performance (Norem & Illingworth, 1993). Furthermore, a series of studies on pref-
actual thinking (i.e., considerations of what may happen) by Sanna (1996) showed 
that defensive pessimists performed better when asked to think of upward pref-
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actuals (e.g., “If only I was more prepared for this task”) rather than downward 
prefactuals (e.g., “There are a number of people who will do worse than me on this 
task”), while the reverse pattern was observed for optimists.
Thus, overall, both systematic optimism and systematic pessimism have been 
found with some prevalence, and each of these biases has been associated with 
certain benefits. Whereas optimism may buffer stress and contribute to positive 
coping and persistence (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1993; Taylor & Armor, 1996), pessi-
mism may buffer anxiety and aid in the management of expectations (e.g., Norem 
& Illingworth, 1993; Sanna, 1996). 
uNdErSTaNdING prEfErENCES fOr OpTIMISTIC  
Or pESSIMISTIC fOrECaSTS
Given that optimism and pessimism may serve different functions, it is possible 
that individuals could selectively favor optimism or pessimism depending on 
their perceptions of the usefulness or appropriateness of either of these outlooks 
for a given situation. Indeed, Sackett and Armor (2010) have recently proposed an 
“intuitive functionalist” account of forecasting biases that attempts to explain how 
this selection occurs (see also Armor et al., 2008). Although people may value accu-
racy as an ideal, they also recognize the difficulty of achieving complete accuracy 
in predicting the future; therefore, they may implicitly or explicitly choose to err 
on the side of optimism or pessimism (i.e., display a forecasting preference) based on 
what they believe to be the immediate consequences of either of these biases.
For example, in a study by Shepperd, Ouellette, and Fernandez (1996), college 
students were asked to predict their exam scores one month before the exam and 
then again at intervals that grew increasingly closer to actually receiving their true 
exam score. Results showed that students began with more optimistic predictions, 
which may have functioned to keep their confidence elevated going into the exam, 
but they progressively shifted to more pessimistic predictions the closer they got 
to receiving the true scores, which may have functioned to manage their anxiety 
(for related examples of situational shifts in prediction biases, see Armor & Sack-
ett, 2006; Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993). Thus, people do appear to be sensitive 
to the possible consequences of optimism or pessimism and to gravitate toward 
either outlook based on which of these consequences is currently more advanta-
geous. 
One important implication of the intuitive functionalist framework is that peo-
ple may selectively use optimistic or pessimistic outlooks as strategies to aid self-
regulation (see also Norem & Cantor, 1986). That is, people may specifically choose 
to adopt optimistic or pessimistic outlooks as a means to help themselves sustain 
a particular motivational orientation. If people are motivated to maximize their ef-
forts toward ensuring positive outcomes, then it would be more advantageous to 
adopt an optimistic outlook that allows them to maintain their orientation toward 
attaining these outcomes better than a pessimistic outlook. Alternatively, if people 
are motivated to maximize their efforts for guarding against negative outcomes, 
then it would be more advantageous to adopt a pessimistic outlook that allows 
them to maintain their orientation toward protecting against these outcomes bet-
ter than an optimistic outlook. The present research investigates this self-regu-
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latory perspective on forecasting preferences by examining how motivations for 
attainment, growth, and advancement versus for maintenance, safety, and security 
are associated with people’s use of optimistic or pessimistic outlooks during goal 
pursuit. 
MOTIvaTING OpTIMISTIC Or pESSIMISTIC  
fOrECaSTING prEfErENCES
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) posits two distinct motivational orienta-
tions that determine how people approach desired outcomes and avoid undesired 
outcomes. A promotion orientation is centered on advancement concerns and the 
focus is on approaching the presence of gains and avoiding the absence of gains 
(i.e., non-gains). Promotion-oriented goal pursuit is thus characterized by motiva-
tions for attaining growth and supports eager strategies of seeking possible gains 
even at the risk of committing errors or accepting some loss. In contrast, a preventi-
on orientation is centered on security concerns and the focus is on approaching the 
absence of losses (i.e., non-losses) and avoiding the presence of losses. Prevention-
oriented goal pursuit is thus characterized by motivation for maintaining secu-
rity and supports vigilant strategies of protecting against possible losses even at 
the risk of missing opportunities or potential gains. Much research has confirmed 
that both chronic and temporarily induced concerns with promotion or preven-
tion consistently produce these types of strategic preferences during goal pursuit 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; see Molden, 
Lee, & Higgins, 2008).
We propose that preferences for an optimistic outlook will be associated with a 
promotion orientation because optimism maintains eager goal pursuit. That is, an 
optimistic outlook orients people toward potential gains and motivates them to 
pursue strategies to achieve these gains. Therefore optimism should be perceived 
as more functional when motivated by promotion concerns. Moreover, these gain-
focused, optimistic mindsets should provide a better match to promotion-focused 
individuals’ current self-regulatory state and thus create greater experiences of 
engagement, or regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000), which can then lead to improved 
performance (Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Freitas, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2002). Similarly, we propose that preferences for a pessi-
mistic outlook will be associated with a prevention orientation because pessimism 
maintains vigilant goal pursuit. That is, a pessimistic outlook orients people to-
ward potential losses and motivates them to pursue strategies that guard against 
such losses. Therefore, pessimism should be perceived as more functional when 
motivated by prevention concerns, and these loss-focused, pessimistic mindsets 
should create greater engagement and regulatory fit for prevention-focused indi-
viduals, which could again lead to improved performance. 
Several lines of existing research on regulatory focus support these proposed 
links between promotion concerns and a preference for optimism, and between 
prevention concerns and a preference for pessimism. First, Grant and Higgins 
(2003) found that although both a stronger chronic focus on promotion and a 
stronger chronic focus on prevention are correlated with indices of well-being and 
an active coping style, only a promotion focus is correlated with dispositional op-
timism. That is, the positive outcomes associated with a promotion focus were 
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found to be at least partially mediated by an optimistic outlook, but the positive 
outcomes associated with a prevention-focus were not related to this outlook. Al-
though this study did not include any measure of dispositional pessimism (e.g., 
Norem & Cantor, 1986), it does provide suggestive evidence that the motivational 
benefits of a promotion focus are at least partially due to increased optimism but 
that the motivational benefits of a prevention focus are unrelated to optimism. 
Further work by Forster, Grant, Idson, and Higgins (2001) shows that whereas 
positive, success-oriented feedback maintains a promotion orientation, negative, 
failure-oriented feedback maintains a prevention orientation. In two studies, For-
ster and colleagues (2001) measured motivational intensity using arm pressure 
(Study 1) and task persistence (Study 2) while participants solved anagrams after 
being primed with promotion or prevention concerns. As predicted, promotion-
focused participants showed more motivational intensity and engagement follow-
ing the success (versus failure) feedback, while prevention-focused participants 
showed more motivational intensity and engagement following the failure (versus 
success) feedback. Similarly, Idson and Higgins (2000) demonstrated that chroni-
cally promotion-focused individuals show increased performance over time after 
success feedback, whereas chronically prevention-focused individuals show in-
creased performance after failure feedback. Because an optimistic mindset essen-
tially involves generating one’s own internal positive expectancies and thoughts 
about success, these findings suggest that such a mindset might also produce regu-
latory fit and improve performance when promotion-focused. In contrast, because 
a pessimistic mindset essentially involves generating one’s own internal negative 
expectancies and thoughts about failure, these findings suggest that such a mind-
set might also produce regulatory fit and improve performance when prevention-
focused (see also Langens, 2007).
In summary, incorporating a regulatory focus perspective with the intuitive 
functionalist account of forecasting preferences leads to the hypotheses that (a) 
promotion-focused individuals will be more likely to prefer optimistic forecasting 
preferences and will show increased engagement and performance when adopt-
ing such preferences, whereas (b) prevention-focused individuals will show more 
pessimistic forecasting preferences, and will show increased engagement and per-
formance when adopting such preferences.
These hypotheses were tested across three studies. Study 1 examined the simple 
associations between chronic motivations for promotion or prevention and gener-
al preferences for optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic outlooks during goal pursuit. 
Study 2 then examined these same associations in the context of people’s perfor-
mance on an upcoming task and further tested the impact of such associations on 
performance. Finally, Study 3 more closely investigated the impact of optimistic 
or pessimistic mindsets on promotion- or prevention-focused individuals’ engage-
ment and performance by directly manipulating these mindsets in the context of 
a problem-solving task.
STudy 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish initial evidence for the predicted rela-
tionships between promotion motivations and optimism and between prevention 
motivations and pessimism. To do this, we tested for correlations between indi-
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viduals’ chronic regulatory focus and their stated preferences for optimism and 
pessimism over realism. To the extent that these two different outlooks are spe-
cifically seen as functional for promotion or prevention motivational orientations, 
then optimism should be preferred over realistic forecasting by those who are 
promotion-oriented, while pessimism should be preferred over realistic forecast-
ing by those who are prevention-oriented. Furthermore, promotion-focused indi-
viduals should report a greater tendency to engage in optimistic thought, whereas 
prevention-focused individuals should report a greater tendency to engage in pes-
simistic thought. 
METhOD
Participants. Participants were 361 students from the Psychology 110 subject pool 
at Northwestern University who completed the study for partial fulfillment of 
course credit. The sample was 41% male (N = 147) and 58% female (N = 210) with 
1% (N = 4) not reporting gender. The mean age of the sample was 18.72 (SD = .91) 
years and ranged from 18 to 22 years. 
Materials and Procedure. As part of a large group-testing session, participants first 
completed a previously validated 11-item measure of chronic regulatory focus 
(RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001; see also Grant & Higgins, 2003). Items on this scale 
ask participants to read a series of statements that tap into their general tendency 
to engage in promotion-focused self-regulation (e.g., “I have often accomplished 
things that got me ‘psyched’ to work even harder”) or prevention-focused self-
regulation (e.g., “I often obeyed rules and regulations that were established by my 
parents”) and rate the extent to which each statement is generally true of them on 
a 1 (Completely Disagree) to 5 (Completely Agree) scale. 
After completing several unrelated measures, participants then were given a 
5-item measure of forecasting preferences adapted from Sackett and Armor (2010). 
The instructions first read: “When thinking about how things will turn out in the 
future it is not always possible to be completely accurate. Please answer the fol-
lowing questions based on how you generally think about future events in your 
life.” Participants were then asked “When making predictions about future events 
it is better to be . . . ” and made ratings on two different 7-point scales, one of which 
had the endpoints pessimistic and realistic, and one of which had the endpoints 
realistic and optimistic. Both scales were numbered from -3 to +3 with the midpoint 
(i.e., 0) labeled indifferent, indicating no preference between the two choices at the 
endpoints. In this way, we were able to assess people’s preferences for optimism 
or pessimism in comparison to a more realistic outlook, which is the most direct 
way to test how functional individuals perceive these outlooks to be.1 After these 
measures, participants then completed three additional items that asked them to 
rate how often their own predictions about the future tended to be “optimistic,” 
“pessimistic,” and “realistic” on a scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always).
1. Although some research suggests that optimism and pessimism are a single construct (see 
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), there is also compelling evidence that when treated as two separate 
variables they predict different things (e.g., Kubzansky, Kubzansky, & Maselko, 2004; Robinson-
Whelen, Kim, MacCallum, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997). Thus, we chose to measure them separately to 
allow for the best understanding of how each construct is related to the outcomes of interest. 
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RESuLTS AnD DiSCuSSiOn
Following the procedures established in previous research, participants’ chronic 
motivations for promotion or prevention scores were calculated by separately av-
eraging their scores on the promotion-oriented (α = .67) and prevention-oriented 
items (α = .79). An index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus was then 
created by subtracting the prevention score from the promotion score.2 Although 
people can vary in the strength of both their promotion and prevention motiva-
tions, in the current research we are interested in the relative strength of partici-
pants’ preference for eager versus vigilant modes of goal-pursuit, and how this 
relative preference is related to the optimistic or pessimistic mindsets that might fit 
with such modes of goal pursuit. This index of predominant regulatory focus has 
been used in numerous published studies (see Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; 
Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Higgins et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2008). More posi-
tive scores on this index indicate a predominant promotion focus, whereas more 
negative scores indicate a predominant prevention focus. 
Table 1 shows that, as predicted, a predominant promotion focus was associated 
with favoring optimistic forecasting and with reporting a greater tendency to per-
sonally adopt an optimistic outlook, whereas a predominant prevention focus was 
associated with favoring pessimistic forecasting and with reporting a greater ten-
dency to personally adopt a pessimistic outlook. That is, more positive scores on 
the regulatory focus index showed significant positive correlations with (a) gen-
eral preferences for optimistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies, and 
(b) reports of personally making optimistic predictions. In contrast, more positive 
scores on the regulatory focus index showed significant (or marginal) negative 
correlations with (a) general preferences for pessimistic as compared to realistic 
forecasting strategies, and (b) reports of personally making pessimistic predic-
tions. There was no correlation between participants’ scores on the regulatory fo-
cus index and their reports of generally making realistic predictions.
This pattern of results indicates that, as hypothesized, motivations for promo-
tion or prevention were related to preferences for optimistic or pessimistic self-
2. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales had a small but marginally significant 
positive correlation in this sample, r = .10, t(359) = 1.85, p = .06.
TablE 1. Correlations between predominant promotion Concerns, personal forecasting Tendencies, 
and General forecasting preferences (Study 1)
Optimism Pessimism Realism
Optimism > 
Realism
Pessimism > 
Realism
Promotion Concerns .26** -.19** .03 .12* -.10†
Optimism — -.61** .08 .43** -.16**
Pessimism — -.09† -.35** .15**
Realism — -.18** -.20**
Optimism > Realism — .06
Pessimism > Realism —
Note. †p < .08; *p < .05; **p < .01.
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regulatory strategies, respectively, even when judged against the alternative of 
attempting to be as realistic (i.e., accurate) as possible. Furthermore, these general 
preferences were also reflected in participants’ reports of their own forecasting 
behavior. However, although Study 1 provides evidence for the general associa-
tion between regulatory focus and preferences for particular forecasting strategies, 
it did not assess whether these same preferences are evident during pursuit of a 
specific goal or how using one’s preferred strategies might further influence goal 
pursuit. Study 2 was therefore designed to address these limitations by measuring 
forecasting preferences for performance on a specific task and investigating how 
the predicted differences in forecasting preferences for those with a predominant 
promotion or prevention orientation relate to actual task performance. 
STudy 2
In Study 2, chronically promotion-focused or prevention-focused participants 
were again asked to report their preferences for optimistic or pessimistic forecast-
ing strategies, but this time concerning an upcoming problem-solving task. After 
stating their preferences, participants then completed this task, which consisted 
of solving a series of anagrams. If promotion-focused individuals not only prefer 
optimistic forecasting strategies, but also benefit motivationally from using such 
strategies, then these individuals should perform better when displaying an opti-
mistic forecasting preference. Similarly, if prevention-focused individuals not only 
prefer pessimistic forecasting strategies, but also benefit motivationally from us-
ing such strategies, then these individuals should perform better when displaying 
a pessimistic forecasting preference
METhOD
Participants. Participants were 32 volunteers who completed the study online 
after following a link from the Social Psychology Network website (www.social-
psychology.org). Participants were not compensated for their participation in this 
study. No demographic information was recorded. 
Materials and Procedures. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was 
“to help us learn more about the psychological processes that occur when people 
think in optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic ways.” They then completed the same 
measure of their promotion or prevention motivations as in Study 1 (RFQ; Higgins 
et al., 2001). Following the RFQ, participants read a brief explanation of anagram 
word problems and were told that they would complete 12 anagrams and answer 
questions about their predictions for their own performance on this task. All the 
anagrams used in this study had multiple solutions (some using all of the letters, 
some using only a subset of the letters) and participants were instructed to find as 
many solutions as they could. 
Before beginning the anagram task, participants completed a two-item measure 
of forecasting preferences similar to the measure used in Study 1. Participants first 
read the following instructions: “We’re interested in how people make predictions 
about their performance on this task. Naturally, it’s rare for such predictions to be 
100% accurate. Instead, people’s predictions are usually either somewhat optimis-
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tic (i.e., expecting a better outcome than is achieved) or somewhat pessimistic (i.e., 
expecting a worse outcome than is achieved). On the page that follows, we would 
like you to answer some questions about your own predictions with these defini-
tions of ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ in mind.” Participants then rated their own 
forecasting preferences for (a) pessimism versus realism and (b) realism versus 
optimism using the same scale as described in Study 1. Following the forecasting 
preference ratings participants completed the anagram task and their correct solu-
tions were tallied. 
RESuLTS AnD DiSCuSSiOn
An index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus was calculated from re-
sponses to the promotion (α = .73) and prevention (α = .75) subscales of the RFQ 
in the same way as described in Study 1.3 More positive scores on this index again 
indicated a predominant promotion focus whereas more negative scores indicated 
a predominant prevention focus. 
Forecasting Preferences for a Specific Goal. Table 2 shows that, again as predicted, 
a predominant promotion focus was associated with more optimistic forecasting 
preferences, whereas a predominant prevention focus was associated with more 
pessimistic forecasting preferences. More positive scores on the regulatory focus 
index showed significant positive correlations with greater preferences for opti-
mistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies. In contrast, more positive 
scores on the regulatory focus index showed a significant negative correlation with 
greater preferences for pessimistic as compared to realistic forecasting strategies. 
This pattern of results replicates and extends the findings of Study 1. In addi-
tion to the broad preferences for optimistic forecasting preferences previously 
observed, promotion-focused individuals also displayed similar preferences for 
a specific upcoming task. Thus, regulatory focus is related not only to an abstract 
endorsement of optimism or pessimism, but also to the specific choice of these 
outlooks in preparation for goal pursuit. 
Effects of Regulatory Focus and Forecasting Preferences on Performance. On average, 
participants found 16.91 (SD = 11.01) correct solutions to the anagram problems. 
In order to further examine whether the forecasting preferences chosen by pro-
motion-focused or prevention-focused individuals were related to the number of 
solutions found, a series of hierarchical linear regression analyses were conducted 
3. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales were not significantly correlated in this 
sample, r = .11, t(30) = .59, p = .56.
TablE 2. Correlations between predominant promotion Concerns and forecasting preferences (Study 
2)
Optimism > realism pessimism > realism
Promotion Concerns .49** -.55**
Optimism > Realism — -.62**
Pessimism > Realism —
note. **p < .01.
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in which the total number of correct solutions was predicted by the main effects of 
forecasting preferences and regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the fore-
casting preference x regulatory focus interaction in a second step. 
When considering effects on performance of preferences for realism versus op-
timism, there were marginal main effects for forecasting preference, β = -.35, t(27) 
= -1.71, p = .10, and regulatory focus, β = .38, t(27) = 1.71, p = .10; however, these 
trends were qualified by a significant interaction, β = .43, t(26) = 2.28, p = .03. To de-
termine the nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 
1991) were performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory 
focus index (indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals, 
respectively) and at 1.5 SD above or below the midpoint of the forecasting prefer-
ence measure (indicating a preference for optimistic or realistic forecasts, respec-
tively). 4 As shown in Figure 1a, among those who preferred optimistic forecasts, 
performance was significantly higher if they also were promotion-focused as com-
pared to prevention-focused, β = 1.65, t(26) = 2.91, p < .01. In contrast, as shown in 
Figure 1b, among those who preferred realistic forecasts there was no significant 
performance difference between those who were promotion-focused as compared 
to prevention focused, β = -.27, t(26) = -.56, p = .58.
When considering effects on performance of preferences for pessimism versus 
realism, there were no significant main effects for forecasting preference, β = .03, 
t(27) = .13, p = .90, or for regulatory focus, β = .03, t(27) = .15, p = .88; however, there 
was a significant interaction, β = .42, t(26) = 2.30, p = .03. To further explore the 
nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) were 
again performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero-point on the regulatory focus 
index and at 1.5 SD above or below the midpoint of the forecasting preference 
measure (indicating a preference for realistic or pessimistic forecasts, respectively). 
As shown in Figure 2a, among those who preferred pessimistic forecasts, perfor-
mance trended lower (albeit only suggestively instead of significantly) if they also 
were promotion focused as compared to prevention focused, β = -.83, t(26) = -1.67, 
p = .11. In contrast, as shown in Figure 2b, among those who preferred realistic 
forecasts performance was marginally higher if they were also promotion-focused 
as compared to prevention focused, β = 1.06, t(26) = 1.96, p = .06.
Overall, these results suggest that favoring optimistic forecasts over realistic 
forecasts was associated with higher performance for promotion-focused than 
prevention-focused participants, whereas favoring realistic forecasts over pessi-
mistic forecasts was associated with lower performance for prevention-focused 
than promotion-focused participants. This pattern of results lends support to our 
hypothesis that, in addition to associations with the types of forecasting strategies 
that are preferred, people’s predominant regulatory focus is also associated with 
how the use of these strategies relates to performance.
4Although simple effects are commonly tested at +/-1 SD, Aiken and West (1991) note that 
the selection of these values is essentially arbitrary. We chose to conduct these analyses at +/-1.5 
SD because these values better capture people who are clearly predominant in one motivational 
orientation and/or mindset. That is, values of +/- 1 SD are roughly equivalent to the 25th and 75th 
percentiles of the scale assuming a normal distribution. Using +/-1.5 SD shifts the focus to the 15th 
and 85th percentiles of the scale; thus examining these more extreme points in the distribution better 
represents the concept of predominant orientations that is the focus of these analyses. When the same 
analyses were conducted at +/- 1 SD the pattern that emerged was virtually the same as the findings 
reported here. 
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In Study 2, we measured people’s reports of their general forecasting prefer-
ences for optimism or pessimism before an anagram task and then used these 
preferences to predict performance on the task. Although participants who en-
dorsed optimistic or pessimistic preferences were presumably more likely to gen-
erate optimistic or pessimistic thoughts in anticipation of the anagram task, we do 
not yet have any direct evidence that these thoughts are what caused the perfor-
mance differences. To provide such evidence, Study 3 further tests the relationship 
between regulatory focus, optimistic or pessimistic forecasting preferences, and 
performance by manipulating the forecasting preferences that participants used 
before a task. Furthermore, if performance differences associated with forecasting 
preferences and regulatory focus are indeed due to regulatory fit, then these dif-
FiGuRE 1. The association between regulatory focus and performance among (a) those who 
preferred optimism over realism and (b) those who preferred realism over optimism (Study 2).
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ferences should be mediated by differences in task engagement (Freitas & Higgins, 
2002; Freitas et al., 2002; see Higgins, 2006). Therefore, Study 3 tests this additional 
possibility as well.
STudy 3
In Study 3, chronically promotion-focused or prevention-focused participants were 
informed that they would be completing a problem-solving task and then asked 
to rehearse either a set of optimistic or pessimistic thoughts. If it is these types of 
thoughts that are responsible for the association of people’s forecasting prefer-
ences with their task performance demonstrated previously, then after rehears-
FiGuRE 2. The association between regulatory focus and performance among (a) those who 
preferred pessimism over realism and (b) those who preferred realism over pessimism (Study 
2).
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ing optimistic thoughts, promotion-focused participants should perform better 
than prevention-focused participants, but after rehearsing pessimistic thoughts, 
prevention-focused participants should perform better than promotion-focused 
participants. In addition, to assess participants’ engagement as well as their per-
formance, this study also included measures of task engagement in terms of per-
sistence at the task.
METhOD
Participants. Participants were 84 students from the Psych 110 subject pool at 
Northwestern University who took part in this study for partial fulfillment of 
course credit. The sample was 48% male (N = 40) and 50% female (N = 42) with 
2% (N = 2) not reporting gender. The mean age of the sample was 19.05 (SD = 1.28) 
years and ranged from 17 to 25 years. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants reviewed all instructions and completed all 
tasks on a computer in a private cubicle. To provide additional convergent valid-
ity for our general findings, participants completed a different measure of chronic 
regulatory focus than was used in Studies 1 and 2. Instead of participants’ self-
reports of their promotion or prevention motivations, this measure, developed by 
Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997) is based upon the chronic activation (i.e., ac-
cessibility) of participants’ own promotion-focused and prevention-focused goals. 
Just as chronic attitude accessibility can serve as an index of attitude strength (e.g., 
Fazio, 1995), much research has shown that chronic accessibility for promotion- 
and prevention-relevant goals can serve as indices of motivational strength (e.g., 
Higgins et al., 1997; Liberman et al., 2001; Molden & Higgins, 2004, 2008). The 
regulatory-focus strength measure used in Study 3 therefore asked participants to 
list, one at a time and in a seemingly random order, four of their own promotion-
relevant goals (i.e., their advancement-oriented hopes and aspirations) and four of 
their own prevention-relevant goals (i.e., their security-oriented duties and obliga-
tions). After each entry, participants rated both the extent to which they aspired 
(or felt obligated) to achieve this goal, and the extent to which they had actually 
achieved it. Participants’ reaction times (RTs) for both the goal-listing and goal-
rating tasks were recorded by the computer. After log-transforming all RTs and 
multiplying them by -1 so that higher values (i.e., smaller response latencies) equal 
greater strength, all the RTs concerning aspirations were then summed to calculate 
promotion strength (α = .73), and all the RTs concerning obligations were then 
summed to calculate prevention strength (α = .67; for complete details see Higgins 
et al., 1997).5 
Following the regulatory-focus strength measure, participants then read a brief 
description of an anagram task they were about to perform. Before engaging in 
this task, half of the participants were randomly assigned to generate optimistic 
thoughts about their performance on this task and the other half were assigned to 
5. Scores on the promotion and prevention subscales were significantly positively correlated in 
this sample, r = .55, t(82) = 5.92, p < .001. However, this correlation is to be expected given that the 
measure of regulatory focus in this study was based off of reaction times on which people show 
stable individual differences. The primary consequence of such colinearity is to reduce power and 
make differential effects more difficult to detect, making the differences observed in this study all the 
more notable. 
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generate pessimistic thoughts about their performance. Optimistic or pessimistic 
thoughts were elicited using a procedure adapted from Sanna (1996). Participants 
were presented with five statements (e.g., “I am confident that I can accomplish 
this task well”; “I have a bad feeling about my performance on this task”) one at 
a time on the computer screen and then were asked to write at least one sentence 
describing how the statement might be true for them in the upcoming task. The 
full text of all of the statements is included in Appendix A. In this way, participants 
in the optimism condition were guided to take an optimistic outlook on their per-
formance and those in the pessimism condition were guided to take a pessimistic 
outlook on their performance.
Participants next completed a set of 16 anagrams taken from Shah, Higgins, and 
Friedman (1998), all of which had multiple possible solutions. They were told to 
find as many solutions as they could for each anagram. As a measure of engage-
ment on the task, the computer recorded how much time participants spent on 
each anagram before moving onto the next one. Overall engagement and task per-
sistence was determined by calculating the total time participants spent on the 
anagram task. To create a measure for performance, the total number of valid so-
lutions found for all 16 anagrams were summed. Finally, as a manipulation check, 
participants rated how they would describe the statements they made about their 
potential performance before the task on a -3 (Pessimistic) to +3 (Optimistic) scale.
RESuLTS AnD DiSCuSSiOn
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, an index of participants’ predominant regulatory focus 
was calculated from their RTs on the regulatory focus strength measure by sub-
tracting their transformed RTs to their prevention-focused goals from their trans-
formed RTs to their promotion-focused goals (see Higgins et al., 1997; Molden & 
Higgins, 2008). More positive scores on this index again indicate a predominant 
promotion focus, whereas more negative scores indicate a predominant preven-
tion focus
Manipulation Checks. In order to ensure that the optimistic versus pessimistic 
outlook manipulation was effective, a hierarchical linear regression was conduct-
ed in which responses to how participants characterized the preparatory state-
ments before the task were predicted by the main effects of the outlook condition 
(coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and predominant regulatory focus 
in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction in 
a second step. There was no significant main effect of regulatory focus strength, 
β = -.05, t(81) = -.61, p = .54, but a significant main effect for outlook condition, β 
= -1.16, t(81) = -6.47, p < .001: Those in the optimistic outlook condition rated the 
statements as being significantly more optimistic (M = 1.41, SD = 1.26) than those 
in the pessimistic outlook condition (M = -1.05, SD = 2.02). There was no signifi-
cant interaction between regulatory focus strength and outlook condition, β = -.24, 
t(80) = -1.34, p = .18. Thus, as expected, those in the optimism condition rated the 
statements as more optimistic than those in the pessimism condition regardless of 
their regulatory focus.
Task Performance. On average, participants found 18.67 (SD = 7.33) correct solu-
tions to the anagram problems. A hierarchical linear regression was conducted 
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in which participants’ correct solutions were predicted by the main effects of the 
outlook condition (coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and their predomi-
nant regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x regulatory 
focus interaction in a second step. There was no significant main effect for regula-
tory focus strength, β = -.10, t(81) = -.93, p = .35, nor for outlook condition, β = -.08, 
t(81) = -.15, p = .88. However, there was a significant interaction effect between reg-
ulatory focus and outlook condition, β = -.67, t(80) = -2.11, p = .04. To determine the 
nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) were 
performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory focus index 
(indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals, respectively) 
within each of the outlook conditions. As shown in Figure 3, in the optimism con-
dition, performance was nonsignificantly higher for promotion-focused partici-
pants (Mpredicted = 20.83) than prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted = 19.40), 
β = .23, t(80) = 0.99, p = .32. In contrast, in the pessimism condition, performance 
was significantly higher for prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted = 18.13) than 
promotion-focused participants (Mpredicted = 11.67) , β = -.44, t(80) = -2.03, p = .04.
Task Engagement. On average, participants spent 451.56 seconds (SD = 252.35) 
working on the anagram problems. A hierarchical linear regression was conducted 
in which participants’ engagement (total time) was predicted by the main effects 
of the outlook condition (coded as 0 for pessimism or 1 for optimism) and their 
predominant regulatory focus in a first step, followed by the outlook condition x 
regulatory focus interaction in a second step. There was no significant main effect 
for regulatory focus strength, β = .06, t(81) = .59, p = .55, and there was a margin-
ally significant main effect for outlook condition, β = -.39, t(81) = -1.79, p = .08. 
However, this effect was again qualified by a significant interaction effect between 
regulatory focus and outlook condition, β = -.47, t(80) = 2.22, p = .03. To determine 
the nature of this interaction, follow-up simple-slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) 
were again performed at 1.5 SD above and below the zero point on the regulatory 
FiGuRE 3. The interaction between induced optimistic or induced pessimistic forecasts and 
regulatory focus on task performance (Study 3).
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focus index (indicating promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals, 
respectively) within each of the outlook conditions. As shown in Figure 4, in the 
optimism condition, engagement was significantly higher for promotion-focused 
participants (Mpredicted = 687.90) than prevention-focused participants (Mpredicted = 
446.04), β = .48, t(80) = 2.04, p = .04. In contrast, in the pessimism condition, en-
gagement was nonsignificantly higher for prevention-focused participants (Mpredic-
ted = 419.02) than promotion-focused participants (Mpredicted = 302.35), β = -.23, t(80) 
= -1.06, p = .29.
Mediation Analyses. The effect of the interaction between regulatory focus and 
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts on performance and engagement as established 
in the previous sections suggest the possibility that engagement may mediate the 
relationship between the regulatory focus and forecasting and performance. In 
other words, it may be that when promotion-oriented individuals make optimistic 
forecasts and prevention-oriented individuals make pessimistic forecasts, engage-
ment in the task increases and their performance is improved. This mediational 
relationship would be consistent with previous regulatory fit findings and would 
support our hypothesis that different forecasting preferences serve to maintain 
difference modes of self-regulation. 
In order to test for mediation, a linear regression was conducted in which par-
ticipants’ correct solutions were predicted by the main effects of outlook, chronic 
regulatory focus, and task engagement (time spent on the problem set), along with 
the outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction. In this analysis, the main ef-
fect of engagement on performance was significant, β = .49, t(79) = 4.87, p < .001, 
and the previously significant outlook condition x regulatory focus interaction 
was no longer significant, β = -.21, t(79) = -1.06, p = .29, suggesting meditation 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). A follow-up Sobel test demonstrated that the indirect effect 
of regulatory focus on performance through task engagement was indeed signifi-
cant, z = 1.99, p = .04.6
The results of Study 3 thus provided additional evidence for the different influ-
ence of optimistic or pessimistic forecasts on engagement and performance for 
promotion-focused versus prevention-focused individuals. Prevention-focused in-
dividuals were nonsignificantly more engaged and performed significantly better 
than promotion-focused individuals when asked to generate pessimistic thoughts 
before an anagram task, whereas promotion-focused individuals were significant-
ly more engaged and performed nonsignificantly better than prevention-focused 
individuals when asked to generate optimistic thoughts before this task. More-
over, supporting a regulatory fit interpretation of these effects, the pattern of dif-
ferences in performance shown by promotion-focused and prevention-focused 
participants were mediated by the pattern of differences in their engagement with 
(i.e., persistence on) the anagram task.
6. Recently, the use of bootstrapping techniques for mediational analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008) has been recommended by many. We therefore also tested for mediation using the MCMAM 
method (Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006) and the results reconfirmed significant mediation, with a 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect between -1.5 and -.08.
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GENEral dISCuSSION
Past research has demonstrated the presence of optimistic (e.g., Weinstein, 1980) 
and pessimistic (e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986) biases and provided arguments for 
the functionality of both outlooks (see Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Scheier & Carv-
er, 1993). Given that both outlooks may convey some benefits, Sackett and Armor 
(2010) have more recently begun to develop a framework for understanding when 
and why people might selectively shift between an optimistic or pessimistic out-
look (see also Armor et al., 2008). The present research expands on this perspec-
tive by investigating motivational orientations that help predict when one outlook 
over the other may be beneficial during goal pursuit. Specifically, we hypothesized 
that motivations for promotion, which focus on gains and advancement, should 
be related to and sustained by a preference for optimistic forecasts, which tend to 
produce eagerness for gains. In contrast, we hypothesized that motivations for 
prevention, which focus on security and protection from loss, should be related 
to and sustained by a preference for pessimistic forecasts, which tend to produce 
vigilance against loss.
These hypotheses were generally supported across three studies using two dif-
ferent measures of chronic motivations for promotion or prevention. Studies 1 and 
2 demonstrated that a chronic focus on promotion was correlated with reported 
preferences and tendencies toward making optimistic forecasts, whereas a chron-
ic focus on prevention was correlated with reported preferences and tendencies 
toward making pessimistic forecasts. This favoring of optimistic or pessimistic 
forecasts was found when each was contrasted with realistic forecasts, which we 
interpret as evidence that participants view these outlooks as potentially more 
beneficial than being accurate in their forecasts. We suggest that this added value 
over realism may reflect the motivational maintenance function of optimism for 
promotion-oriented individuals and pessimism for prevention-oriented individu-
als. Further supporting this motivational maintenance prediction—as shown in 
FiGuRE 4. The interaction between induced optimistic or induced pessimistic forecasts and 
regulatory focus on task engagement (Study 3).
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Study 2—this pattern of results emerged not only for people’s generally stated 
preferences, but also for their preferences concerning a specific task that they were 
preparing to complete.
Studies 2 and 3 further demonstrated that optimistic forecasting preferences led 
to greater engagement and performance among promotion-focused participants, 
whereas pessimistic forecasting preferences led to greater engagement and per-
formance among prevention-focused participants. Because all of the specific com-
parisons between the associations between the forecasting preferences of promo-
tion-focused and prevention-focused participants and their performance did not 
always reach conventional levels of statistical significance within each study, we 
conducted separate meta-analyses of these comparisons for optimistic and pessi-
mistic mindsets. To derive the meta-analytic effect size across studies, the standard-
ized regression coefficients for the regulatory focus index in each of the relevant 
analyses was weighted by the reciprocal of its variance and then averaged across 
studies. The standard error for this average effect was calculated as the average 
of the square root of the reciprocal of the weights (see Greenland & Longnecker, 
1987). Combining the regulatory focus effect among those preferring optimistic 
over realistic forecasts in Study 2 and those induced to make optimistic forecasts in 
Study 3 revealed a significant overall effect, z = 2.22, p = .03. Similarly, combining 
the regulatory focus effect among those preferring pessimistic over realistic fore-
casts in Study 2 and those induced to make pessimistic forecasts in Study 3 also 
revealed a significant overall effect, z = -2.40, p = .02. Thus, overall, these studies 
support the conclusions that optimistic mindsets improved performance for pro-
motion-focused individuals and that pessimistic mindsets improved performance 
for prevention-focused individuals to a generally equivalent degree. Finally, Study 
3 provided direct evidence that these performance differences shown by promo-
tion- or prevention-focused individuals were mediated by differences in task en-
gagement, which supports a regulatory fit interpretation of these effects.
The present research extends prior research on optimism and pessimism in sev-
eral ways. First, the consideration of motivational influences on forecasting prefer-
ences extends the framework proposed by Sackett and Armor (2010; Armor et al., 
2008) by providing a general motivational perspective that explains why optimis-
tic or pessimistic outlooks are beneficial when adopted by those with a promo-
tion or prevention focus, respectively. Because optimism encourages a focus on 
potential positive outcomes, it generally fits a promotion focus and is functional 
for maintaining promotion-oriented goal pursuit. On the other hand, because pes-
simism encourages a focus on potential negative outcomes, it generally fits a pre-
vention focus and is functional for maintaining prevention-oriented goal pursuit 
(see Higgins, 2000). Thus, the present research incorporates research on regulatory 
fit (Higgins, 2000) with current perspectives on the function of optimistic and pes-
simistic biases (Sackett & Armor, 2010).
A second contribution of the present studies to research on optimism and pes-
simism is that they help to unify the somewhat conflicting literature on the ben-
efits of optimism (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1993) and the benefits of pessimism (e.g., 
Norem & Illingworth, 1993). On the whole, our findings suggest that optimistic 
and pessimistic forecasting preferences can each serve an important functional 
purpose depending upon one’s current motivational orientation. Optimism can 
92 hazlETT ET al.
perhaps allow people to engage in positive coping and adjustment (e.g., Taylor & 
Armor, 1988), as long as people are promotion-focused and disposed toward more 
eager, gain-focused means of goal pursuit. However, when people are prevention-
focused, our findings suggest that these eager means may not motivate the same 
coping and adjustment when challenged. Furthermore, pessimism can perhaps 
allow people to reduce their anxiety (e.g., Norem & Illingworth, 1993) about en-
gaging in particular activities that help them achieve their goals, as long as people 
are prevention-focused and disposed toward more vigilant, loss-focused means of 
goal pursuit. However, when people are promotion-focused, our findings suggest 
that these vigilant means might not motivate anxiety reduction or task engage-
ment in the same way. Therefore, the present studies help to integrate the some-
times disparate perspectives on the functional value of optimism and pessimism 
by providing a motivational account of when and why each outlook can sustain 
engagement and performance.
Beyond these contributions to research on optimism and pessimism, the pres-
ent studies also extend previous research on regulatory focus and goal pursuit. 
Previous studies (Forster et al., 2001; Idson & Higgins, 2000) have shown that pro-
motion-focused individuals are more engaged and persistent when they receive 
positive feedback about their initial performance, whereas prevention-focused in-
dividuals are more engaged and persistent when they receive negative feedback. 
The present studies suggest that not only do people respond in this manner to 
different types of external feedback, but that they also attempt to internally gener-
ate this feedback themselves by adopting optimistic or pessimistic mindsets. That 
is, as most directly indicated by Study 2, at times people may attempt to self-gen-
erate regulatory fit to maintain persistence and performance. Furthermore, theses 
results were demonstrated across multiple methodologies with both self-report 
measures of chronic regulatory focus (Studies 1 and 2) and an implicit response-
time measure of chronic regulatory focus activation (Study 3). 
Although the present work suggests that promotion motivations are related to 
optimism and prevention motivations are related to pessimism, it is important to 
note that these motivational orientations are not simple proxies for dispositional 
optimism or pessimism. Indeed, while Grant and Higgins (2003) found that chron-
ic promotion orientation was related to dispositional optimism, the size of this 
correlation was modest (r = .33) and suggests that these constructs are not entirely 
overlapping. Additionally, while defensive pessimism is usually defined and mea-
sured in the relatively narrow terms of a disparity between positive performance 
history and negative performance expectancy (see Norem & Cantor, 1986), the 
present work provides a broader motivational framework (i.e., prevention motiva-
tions) for understanding the origins and strategic value of this type of response. 
The theoretical advances in predicting and understanding people’s forecasting 
preferences that are provided by the present findings thus open the door to ad-
ditional studies that further elaborate on the motivational dynamics of optimism 
and pessimism. That is, individual differences in motivations for promotion or 
prevention is just one of many factors that might explain when and why people 
choose optimistic or pessimistic outlooks. Given that all existing research on the 
intuitive functionalist perspective on forecasting preferences has been conducted 
in the United States, one clear direction for future research would be to examine 
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whether different cultural contexts can also motivate different forecasting prefer-
ences through lay theories or cultural norms. 
Future research could also address some of the limitations of the present studies. 
The scales used to measure preferences for optimism and pessimism were quite 
short and relied on simple self-report. While these scales have the advantage of 
being face-valid and easy to administer, it is also possible that using more com-
prehensive measures of preferences for optimism and pessimism would enhance 
our understanding of the relationship between motivational orientation and fore-
casting preferences. Additionally, while optimistic and pessimistic outlooks were 
both measured (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated (Study 3) in the present re-
search, regulatory focus was always measured and never manipulated. Therefore, 
another important direction for future research is to further examine how and why 
systematic differences in optimistic or pessimistic forecasting preferences shift in 
response to different situations in which broader motivations relevant for these 
preferences might be temporarily activated. Much previous research has shown 
that a promotion or prevention focus can be temporarily activated by a variety of 
momentary experiences or incentives (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Molden, 
Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009; Seibt & Forster, 2004; Shah et al., 1998; see 
Molden et al., 2008). If such temporary activation of people’s regulatory focus can 
reproduce the same forecasting preferences and performance differences as dem-
onstrated here, it would further extend the intuitive functionalist perspective pro-
posed by Sackett and Armor (2010) and have important implications for designing 
interventions to boost performance in circumstances that generally evoke promo-
tion motivations (e.g., making new friends, increasing one’s physical fitness) or 
prevention motivations (e.g., saving for retirement, maintaining one’s health). In 
addition, circumstances in which other broad motivations that activate more opti-
mistic or pessimistic outlooks could be identified as well.
CONCluSION
Given the difficulty of accurately predicting the future, people may instead be left 
with a choice of whether to try to err on the side of optimistic or pessimistic fore-
casts. The present research reveals both theoretical and behavioral implications 
of such choices by demonstrating that motivations for advancement (e.g., promo-
tion) are more compatible with, and better sustained by, an optimistic outlook, 
whereas motivations for security (e.g., prevention) are more compatible with, and 
better sustained by, a pessimistic outlook. Future research along these lines could 
lead to a better understanding of when and why people adopt and communicate 
particular expectations about important goals as well as the impact of these expec-
tations on whether or not they succeed at these goals.
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appENdIx a. STaTEMENTS uSEd IN ThE OuTlOOK 
MaNIpulaTION IN STudy 3
Optimistic
I will perform better than I expect on this task. 
Most people will perform worse than me on this task. 
This task will not be challenging for me. 
I am confident that I can accomplish this task well. 
I have a good feeling about my performance on this task.
Pessimistic
I will perform worse than I expect on this task. 
Most people will perform better than me on this task. 
This task will be challenging for me. 
I am not confident that I can accomplish this task well. 
I have a bad feeling about my performance on this task.
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